Independent products in infinite spaces by Miranda Menéndez, Enrique & Zaffalon, Marco
Independent products in infinite spaces
Enrique Mirandaa,∗, Marco Zaffalonb
aUniversity of Oviedo, Department of Statistics and Operations Research, C-Calvo Sotelo, s/n, 33007 Oviedo, Spain
bIstituto Dalle Molle di Studi sull’Intelligenza Artificiale (IDSIA)
Galleria 2, 6928 Manno (Lugano), Switzerland
Abstract
Probabilistic independence, intended as the mutual irrelevance of given variables, can be solidly founded on a notion
of self-consistency of an uncertainty model, in particular when probabilities go imprecise. There is nothing in this
approach that prevents it from being adopted in very general setups, and yet it has mostly been detailed for variables
taking finitely many values. In this mathematical study, we complement previous research by exploring the extent
to which such an approach can be generalised. We focus in particular on the independent products of two variables.
We characterise the main notions, including some of factorisation and productivity, in the general case where both
spaces can be infinite and show that, however, there are situations—even in the case of precise probability—where no
independent product exists. This is not the case as soon as at least one space is finite. We study in depth this case at the
frontiers of well-behaviour detailing the relations among the most important notions; we show for instance that being
an independent product is equivalent to a certain productivity condition. Then we step back to the general case: we give
conditions for the existence of independent products and study ways to get around its inherent limitations.
Keywords: Independence, irrelevance, imprecise probability, coherence, infinite spaces, factorisation.
1. Introduction
Independence is a founding notion for very many probabilistic models and applications. Despite its widespread
use, there are substantial aspects of this notion that are still troublesome, in particular when we stick to the traditional
approach to defining independence—the one based on requiring that a joint probability factorises. To make an example,
if we say that events A and B are independent when P (A ∩B) = P (A)P (B), what we get is that A is independent of
any other event B if P (A) = 0, including the event B = Ac! This happens because the traditional definition neglects
the issues originated by zero probabilities. This affects the case of finite spaces of possibility and even more the models
based on infinite spaces, where it is very common that each element in the space has zero probability. The situation
becomes more complex when we consider models that allow for imprecisely specified probabilities. In this case an
event A has both a lower probability P (A) and an upper probability P (A), so it can happen that P (A) = 0 < P (A).
It is clear that in this case we should have a uniform way to deal with independence that works irrespective of the
positivity of probabilities. The imprecise case poses a series of other challenges as well: it has been shown that there
are many possible definitions of independence in such a generalised setup [2, 7]; very often imprecise probability
models are made of sets of finitely additive probabilities, which create additional complications w.r.t. the more regular
countably additive probabilities.
It has been Walley to illustrate [24, Chapter 9] that all these issues can be nicely and uniformly addressed by a shift
of paradigm in the way we define independence. Walley’s approach is based on joining two pre-existing ideas. The
first, which has its roots in the subjective approach to probability, as well as in the artificial intelligence community, is
regarding independence as the mutual irrelevance of two events (or variables). The second, especially due to de Finetti,
is that probabilistic models can be founded on a notion of self-consistency—most often called coherence. In this paper
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we shall, for the most part, refer to Walley’s coherence notion [24, Section 7.1.4(b)]. We can think of coherence as a
stronger way to define probabilistic models than through a joint distribution. In fact, the existence of a joint distribution
compatible with some marginal and conditional distributions, can equivalently be formulated as a self-consistency
requirement, which is however weaker than coherence (see, e.g., [17, Section 4]). This weakness shows up dramatically
just when there are events with zero probability, when we work in infinite spaces, when we deal with finitely additive
probabilities, and of course also when we deal with imprecise probability. This is the reason why the stronger notion of
coherence is at the basis of a more powerful approach to defining indepedence.
So how do we formulate independence through coherence? Consider variables X1 and X2, taking values from X1
and X2, respectively. We just say that a joint probabilistic model for these variables is an independent product of the
marginal information we have about X1 and X2 if it is coherent with our assessment that knowledge of one of the two
variables does not affect knowledge about the other variable. It is an independent product, in other words, if it is not
inconsistent with two assessments of irrelevance: the irrelevance of X1 to X2 and of X2 to X1. Given that coherence
is a notion defined under very general assumptions, we have automatically a well-posed way to discuss the notion
of independence across all the situations mentioned above. As we said, approaching independence from the point of
view of coherence has its roots in Walley’s seminal book, which laid down the main ideas. Vicig [23] then pursued
similar ideas using a weaker notion of coherence by Williams [25] (we call it W-coherence); his work addressed the
case of infinite spaces of possibility, while restricting the attention to the special case of lower probabilities rather than
expectations (or, as we call them, previsions). Finally, de Cooman and ourselves [10, 12] have studied the case of finite
spaces of possibility, while allowing for more than two variables; the work focused in particular on the least-committal
(or least precise, or weakest) independent product, which is called the independent natural extension, and on ways to
relate it to different forms of factorisation. The independent natural extension is an important concept as it is the only
independent product that is solely based on the mutual irrelevance of the variables under consideration.
In this paper, we analyse the independent products of two variables aiming at the greatest possible generality—thus
covering the case of infinite spaces of possibility—as well as at establishing firm relations with known notions of
factorisation—thus investigating the extent to which the traditional notion of independence and the notion based on
coherence are compatible. After some preliminary concepts are given in Section 2, we start work on independent
products in Section 3. First, we remark by an example that two given marginals may not admit any independent product
when both spaces X1,X2 are infinite, not even in the case of precise probability: this shows that there are limits to
the possibility to define independence in the general case. As a consequence, the independent natural extension may
not exist either, unlike the case of finite spaces [12]. Yet, when it exists, we show that it can be characterised as the
intersection of the two sets of probabilities that express irrelevance of X1 to X2 and of X2 to X1: this is a remarkably
simple form of the independent natural extension that we expect to lead to a substantial increase of its use in practice.
We also recall two main factorisation properties of an uncertainty model in the case of imprecise probabilities: one
indeed called factorisation and a weaker one called productivity; we give new and simpler formulations of this second
property, and relate it to the generalisation of Bayes’ rule for the imprecise case (which is referred to as GBR for short).
Then we try to understand what is the most general setup where independent products are always well defined. We
show in Section 4 that for this to be the case it is enough that one of the spaces X1,X2 is finite. It turns out that this
case also delimits the boundary of well-behaviour: we show, for instance, that in this case the independent products are
characterised as the (closed and convex) sets of probabilities that are included in the one that defines the independent
natural extension; moreover, that productivity and being an independent product are equivalent notions. We show
also that among them there is the strong product, which is a well-known extension of probabilistic independence to
imprecise probability obtained through sets of precise-probability (stochastically) independent models. This nicely
relates to the factorisation condition, as we show that any model not weaker than the independent natural extension
and not stronger than the strong product is factorising. While doing this, we give simple sufficient conditions for the
equality of the independent natural extension and the strong product, which are also equivalent conditions for the
former to coincide with one of the models that express irrelevance of X1 to X2 or vice versa. Finally, we show that
when both X1 and X2 are finite, the strong product is the most precise independent product that factorises. This can
easily be extended to any finite number of variables, thus closing a few open problems from [12].
In Section 5 we step back to the general case where both X1,X2 can be infinite and propose two alternative paths
to deal with it. In the first, we give sufficient conditions for the existence of an independent product. In the second,
we consider weakening Walley’s coherence notion so as to allow for a (weaker) notion of independence to exist in
general. In particular, motivated by Vicig’s work [23], we turn to Williams’ coherence notion, which we reformulate
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in Walley’s framework: we call it W-coherence. We show that W-independent products always exist and are those
that upon conditioning by GBR yield models that express the irrelevance of X1 to X2 and of X2 to X1. On the other
hand, we give a number of examples showing that W-independent products appear to be unreasonable because of
the weakness of W-coherence: for instance, any precise model that assigns zero probability to the singletons is a
W-independent product of every pair of marginals. We thus stop focusing on W-coherence and rather consider irrelevant
products, that is, models that are coherent with just one irrelevance assessment (of X1 to X2 or vice versa, but not
both), which are actually enough for quite some useful applications (e.g., [1, 8]). These products always exist and are
given a simple characterisation. Therefore they can as well be considered an alternative avenue, and one that is close to
the best we can do, in case independent products do not exist.
In order to improve readibility, all the proofs and a few more technical results have been relegated to Appendix A
and Appendix B. The latter, in particular, considers what happens to independent products in case we use a consistency
notion stronger than Walley’s: that of conglomerable coherence, which we have proposed in [18]. The appendix shows
that, under relatively weak assumptions, both this and Walley’s coherence notion originate the same independent
products, so that the study carried out in this paper under Walley’s notion can be largely regarded as addressing the
more stringent notion too.
2. Coherent lower previsions
Given a possibility space Ω, a gamble is a bounded real-valued function f : Ω→ R. We shall denote by L(Ω) the
set of all gambles on Ω, and by L+(Ω) := {f ∈ L(Ω) : f ≥ 0, f 6= 0} the set of all positive gambles.
Definition 1 (Coherent lower previsions). Consider a possibility space Ω. A lower prevision is a functional P : K → R
on some subset K of L(Ω). If K is linear, P is called coherent when:
• P (f) ≥ infω∈Ω f(ω);
• P (λf) = λP (f);
• P (f + g) ≥ P (f) + P (g),
for any f, g ∈ K and any λ > 0. When K = L(Ω) and the third condition holds with equality for every f, g ∈ L(Ω),
P is called a linear prevision and is denoted by P .
The behavioural interpretation of P (f) is that of the supremum acceptable buying price for the gamble f . Given
a lower prevision P with domain K, its associated credal set is given byM(P ) := {P : P (f) ≥ P (f) ∀f ∈ K}.
Then it holds that P is coherent if and only if it is the lower envelope of its associated credal set, that is, iff P (f) =
min{P (f) : P ∈M(P )} ∀f ∈ K. Moreover,M(P ) is compact in the weak-* topology and convex, and a one-to-one
correspondence can be established between coherent lower previsions and weak-* compact and convex sets of linear
previsions. The conjugate of a coherent lower prevision, given by P (f) := −P (−f) for any gamble f , is called a
coherent upper prevision. In the case of events, it holds that P (A) = 1− P (Ac) ∀A ⊆ Ω.
One interesting instance of coherent lower previsions are the vacuous ones, which are those such that P (f) = inf f
for every gamble f , and that model complete ignorance. At the other side of the spectrum we find linear previsions,
which correspond to the absence of imprecision.
Conditional lower previsions are defined in a way analogous to the unconditional case:
Definition 2 (Conditional lower previsions). Consider a possibility space Ω, and let B be a partition of Ω. A separately
coherent conditional lower prevision P (·|B) is a functional from L(Ω)× B to R satisfying the following conditions
for every f, g ∈ L(Ω), B ∈ B and every λ > 0:
• P (f |B) ≥ infω∈B f(ω) (avoiding sure loss).
• P (λf |B) = λP (f |B) (positive homogeneity).
• P (f + g|B) ≥ P (f |B) + P (g|B) (super-additivity).
Given a conditional lower prevision P (·|B), the support of a gamble f is given by S(f) := {B ∈ B : Bf 6= 0}.
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Note that an unconditional lower prevision P corresponds to the particular case where the partition is B = {Ω}.
Given a conditional lower prevision P (·|B) and a gamble f , we shall use the notations G(f |B) := IB(f − P (f |B))
and G(f |B) := ∑B∈BG(f |B) = ∑B∈B IB(f −P (f |B)), where IB denotes the indicator function of set B. Given a
partition B of Ω, a gamble is called B-measurable when it is constant on the elements of B. One instance is the gamble
P (f |B), which takes the value P (f |B) on the elements of B; then we can also express G(f |B) = f − P (f |B).
We shall use the following consequence of separate coherence in the proofs [24, Theorem 6.2.6(`)]:
P (fg|B) = fP (g|B) for every B-measurable f ∈ L+(Ω), and every g ∈ L(Ω). (1)
In this paper, we shall focus on the particular case where Ω = X1 × X2 and we condition on the partitions
{{x1} × X2 : x1 ∈ X1}, {X1 × {x2} : x2 ∈ X2} of Ω. To simplify the notation, we shall use P (f |x1), P (f |x2) to
denote P (f |{x1} × X2), P (f |X1 × {x2}), respectively. Similarly, P (·|X1), P (·|X2) will refer to the lower previsions
conditional on the partitions {{x1} × X2 : x1 ∈ X1}, {X1 × {x2} : x2 ∈ X2} of X1 ×X2. We shall say that a gamble
f on X1 × X2 is X1-measurable when it is constant on the elements of the partition {{x1} × X2 : x1 ∈ X1}, that
is, when f(x1, x2) = f(x1, x′2) ∀x1 ∈ X1, x2, x′2 ∈ X2; the notion of X2-measurable gamble is defined similarly.
Note that the set of X1-measurable gambles is in a one-to-one correspondence with L(X1), and similarly the set of
X2-measurable gambles is in a one-to-one correspondence with L(X2). Then if we have a coherent lower prevision P
on L(X1×X2), its marginals P 1, P 2 are its restrictions to the sets of X1,X2-measurable gambles, respectively. Taking
the previous comment into account, we shall sometimes say that they are defined on L(X1),L(X2).
We shall consider a number of coherence notions for conditional lower previsions. They are defined in the following
way.
Definition 3 (Coherence). Consider separately coherent conditional lower previsions P 1(·|B1), . . . , Pm(·|Bm) on
L(Ω). They are called:









(ω) ≥ 0; (2)








(ω) ≥ 0; (3)
• W-coherent1 when Eq. (2) holds for every f0, f1, . . . , fm ∈ L(Ω), j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and B0 ∈ Bj such that Si(fi)
is finite for every i = 1, . . . ,m;
• weakly W-coherent when Eq. (3) holds for every f0, f1, . . . , fm ∈ L(Ω), j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and B0 ∈ Bj such that
Si(fi) is finite for every i = 1, . . . ,m.
One particular case of interest in this paper is that where we study the coherence of one conditional and one
unconditional lower prevision:
Proposition 1. [24, Theorem 6.5.3] Let P , P (·|B) be a coherent lower prevision and a separately coherent conditional
lower prevision on L(Ω). They are coherent if and only if
P (G(f |B)) = 0 ∀f ∈ L(Ω), B ∈ B; (GBR)
P (G(f |B)) ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ L(Ω). (CNG)
In the particular case where B is finite, P , P (·|B) are coherent if and only they satisfy generalised Bayes rule (GBR):
in fact, (CNG), which is a condition of so-called conglomerability, follows from (GBR) in that case.
1This is a restricted version of Williams’ coherence obtained when a lower prevision is only allowed to be conditional on a partition of Ω. This is
not required in Williams’ original formulation; we use such a restricted version in this paper in order to compare it with Walley’s theory, which is
instead based on conditioning partitions. See Remark 1 in Section 5 for a discussion about this point with regard to independence.
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One particular instance we shall use repeatedly in the proofs is the following:
Proposition 2. [24, Sections 6.7.2 and 6.7.3] Let P (·|B) be a separately coherent lower prevision on L(Ω), and let P
be a coherent lower prevision on the set of B-measurable gambles.
(a) The smallest coherent lower prevision on L(Ω) that is coherent with P (·|B) and coincides with P on B-
measurable gambles is given by P (P (·|B)).
(b) If P (·|B) = P (·|B) is linear, then P (P (·|B)) is the only coherent lower prevision that is coherent with P (·|B)
and coincides with P on B-measurable gambles.
3. Independent products
Consider two variables X1, X2 taking values in respective spaces X1,X2. We shall assume throughout that X1, X2
are logically independent [14], meaning that their joint (X1, X2) can assume any value in the product space X1 ×X2.
Let P 1, P 2 be the coherent lower previsions on L(X1),L(X2) that model the marginal information about the variables
X1, X2. Our goal in this paper is to establish how to combine these two marginal lower previsions into a joint coherent
lower prevision P on L(X1 ×X2), under an assumption of independence between the two variables.
There are several ways in which independence can be modelled when we consider sets of probabilities, or coherent
lower previsions [2, 7]. In this paper, we shall found the notion of independence on the assessment of mutual irrelevance
between two variables, which in our opinion is the most sound from the point of view of a behavioural theory of
probability. Consider two possibility spaces X1,X2, and let P 1, P 2 be two coherent lower previsions with respective
domains L(X1),L(X2). Define the conditional lower previsions P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) on L(X1 × X2) by expressing
their mutual irrelevance, which is to say that2
P 1(f |x2) := P 1(f(·, x2)) and P 2(f |x1) := P 2(f(x1, ·)) ∀f ∈ L(X1 ×X2), x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2. (4)
The behavioural interpretation of these conditional lower previsions is that the supremum buying price for a gamble f ,
conditional on the observation of x2 ∈ X2, coincides with the unconditional supremum buying price for the gamble
f(·, x2) (and similarly if we condition on the observation of the value in X1). In other words, we are expressing that a
subject’s beliefs do not change with observations (see [5, 6, 8] for applications of this way to define independence).
Note also that the supports of a gamble f with respect to the conditional lower previsions above are given by
S1(f) := {x2 ∈ X2 : f(·, x2) 6= 0} and S2(f) := {x1 ∈ X1 : f(x1, ·) 6= 0}.
Definition 4 (Independent product). A coherent lower prevision P on L(X1 × X2) is said to be an independent
product (of its marginals P 1, P 2) if P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are coherent.
Since coherence is preserved by lower envelopes [24, Theorem 7.1.6], we can give the following notion:
Definition 5 (Independent natural extension). Given coherent lower previsions P 1, P 2 on L(X1),L(X2), we call
their independent natural extension P 1 ⊗ P 2 the smallest independent product of these marginals.
The first thing we should remark is that the given marginals P 1, P 2 may not possess any independent product, and
as a consequence the independent natural extension may not exist:3
Example 1. Consider X1 := N and X2 := −N. Let P1, P2 be two linear previsions with respective domains
L(N),L(−N) such that their restrictions to events satisfy P1({n}) = P2(−{n}) = 0 for every natural number
n. It follows from Proposition 2(b) that the only coherent lower prevision with marginal P2 that is coherent with
P1(·| − N) is P2(P1(·| − N)). The same proposition implies that the only coherent lower prevision with marginal P1
that is coherent with P2(·|N) is given by P1(P2(·|N)). Thus, in order to show that P1, P2 do not have any independent
product it suffices to show that P1(P2(·|N)) and P2(P1(·| − N)) do not coincide.
2Recall that Walley’s theory of coherence, which is the one we are considering in this paper, requires the conditional and unconditional lower
previsions to be defined on gambles over the same space; in this case, the domain of P , P 1(·|X2) and P 2(·|X1) is L(X1 ×X2), even if P 1(·|X2)
and P 2(·|X1) are derived from the coherent lower previsions P 1, P 2 that have respective domains L(X1),L(X2), in the manner described below.
See again the comments after Eq. (1).
3This example is based on the Cantelli-Le´vy paradox discussed by Walley in [24, Section 7.3.4].
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Consider the set A := {(n,−m) ∈ N × −N : n −m ≤ 0}. Then P1(P2(A|N)) = P1(1) = 1, since for every
natural number n,
P2(A|n) = P2({−m : (n,−m) ∈ A}) = P2({−m : m ≥ n}) = 1.
On the other hand, P2(P1(A| − N)) = P2(0) = 0, since for every natural number m,
P1(A| −m) = P1({n : (n,−m) ∈ A}) = P1({1, . . . ,m}) = 0.
We conclude therefore that P1, P2 do not have an independent product. 
Next, we take advantage of the reduction theorem in Walley [24, Theorem 7.1.5], which shows that the coherence
of P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) can be decomposed into two subproblems: the coherence of P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) and the
weak coherence of P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1). The latter is characterised in the following result, which also gives a new
characterisation of the independent natural extension. Here, and in what follows, we shall use the simplified notations
P 1(P 2) := P 1(P 2(·|X1)) and P 2(P 1) := P 2(P 1(·|X2)).
This also helps to stress that the conditional lower previsions P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are derived from P 1, P 2 by means of
an assessment of irrelevance.
Theorem 3. Consider a coherent lower prevision P on L(X1 ×X2) with marginals P 1, P 2.
(a) P , P 1(·|X2) are coherent if and only if P ≥ P 2(P 1).
(b) P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are weakly coherent if and only if P ≥ max{P 2(P 1), P 1(P 2)}.
(c) If P 1, P 2 have an independent product, the smallest one is the smallest coherent lower prevision that dominates
both P 1(P 2) and P 2(P 1). In other words,M(P 1 ⊗ P 2) =M(P 1(P 2)) ∩M(P 2(P 1)).
A formal study of independence was made in [12], in terms of the factorisation properties of independent products.
We recall the following definitions:
Definition 6 (Factorisation and productivity). A coherent lower prevision P on L(X1 ×X2) is factorising when
P (f1f2) = P (f1P (f2)) and P (g1g2) = P (g2P (g1)) ∀f1 ∈ L+(X1), g1 ∈ L(X1), f2 ∈ L(X2), g2 ∈ L+(X2),
and it is productive when
P (f1 · (f2 − P (f2))) ≥ 0 and P (g2 · (g1 − P (g1))) ≥ 0 ∀f1 ∈ L+(X1), g1 ∈ L(X1), f2 ∈ L(X2), g2 ∈ L+(X2).
Factorising-like properties of independent products have been established for events in a number of works [2, 23].
Since the behavioural theory of imprecise probabilities is established in terms of gambles, we think that the most sound
definition of factorisation is the one considered above, which implies in particular the strong factorisation property
from [23, Section 3.5]. With respect to productivity, when formulated for sequences of variables and not only two of
them it has been linked to weak and strong laws of large numbers in [9].
Note also that a factorising lower prevision P satisfies in particular that P (fg) = P (f)P (g) for every f ∈
L+(X1), g ∈ L+(X2). As we shall see in Example 3 later on, that condition is not sufficient for factorisation 4.
Next we are going to provide a characterisation of these conditions that will help us later in establishing their
relationship with independence.
Proposition 4. Consider a coherent lower prevision P on L(X1 ×X2), with marginals P 1, P 2:
4Note also that a similar condition, requiring P(fg)=P(f)P(g) for any pair of gambles f,g will not be related to independence: it can be checked
for instance that a vacuous coherent lower prevision will be an independent product of its (vacuous) marginals (this follows for instance from
Proposition 5 in this paper), and it is factorizing in the sense we consider in the paper. However, it does not factorise in the sense considered
above: if we take for instance the vacuous coherent lower prevision on {0, 1} × {2, 3}, f = I0 − I1 and g = I2 − I3, then P (fg) = −1 while
P (f) = −1 = P (g), and therefore P (f) · P (g) = 1 6= P (fg).
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(a) P is productive⇔
{
P (A1(f2 − P (f2))) = 0 ∀A1 ⊆ X1, f2 ∈ L(X2)
P (A2(f1 − P (f1))) = 0 ∀A2 ⊆ X2, f1 ∈ L(X1)
⇔
{
P (f1f2) ≥ P (f1P (f2)) ∀f1 ∈ L+(X1), f2 ∈ L(X2)
P (g1g2) ≥ P (g2P (g1)) ∀g2 ∈ L+(X2), g1 ∈ L(X1).
(b) If P is factorising, then it is productive.
(c) If P dominates both P 1(P 2) and P 2(P 1), then it is productive.
(d) If P is productive, then it satisfies (GBR) with P 1(·|X2) and P 2(·|X1).
To see that the converse of the second statement does not hold in general, we refer to [12, Example 3]. Let us show
that the converse of the fourth statement does not hold in general either:
Example 2. Consider X1 := X2 := N, and let P be a linear prevision on X1 × X2 whose restriction to events
satisfies P ({n} × N) = P (N × {n}) = 0 for every n, and P ({2n − 1 : n ∈ N} × {2n − 1 : n ∈ N}) = 12 =
P ({2n : n ∈ N} × {2n : n ∈ N}). Let P1, P2 be the marginals of P . Since P1({n}) = 0 for every n, then given
a gamble f on X1 × X2, it holds that P (G1(f |n)) = P (I{n}(f(·, n) − P1(f(·, n)))) = 0; in fact, denoting g :=
f(·, n)− P1(f(·, n)), we get 0 = P ({n}) inf g = P (I{n} inf g) ≤ P (I{n}g) ≤ P (I{n} sup g) = P ({n}) sup g = 0.
This shows that P, P1(·|X2) satisfy (GBR). Similarly, P also satisfies (GBR) with P2(·|X1). To prove that it is not
productive, take f2 ∈ L(X2) given by f2 := IB − IBc , where B := {2n : n ∈ N}, and take A ⊆ X1 be given by
A := {2n − 1 : n ∈ N}. Then P2(f2) = P2(B) − P2(Bc) = 0, so that P (A(f2 − P2(f2))) = 0 − 12 < 0, given
that {(even, even), (even, odd), (odd, even), (odd, odd)} is a partition of N× N. We conclude from this that P is not
productive. 
4. Independent products when one of the spaces is finite
We proceed to show that, when one of the possibility spaces is finite, there always exists an independent product of
the marginals P 1, P 2.
Proposition 5. Consider a coherent lower prevision P with marginals P 1, P 2, and define P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) by
Eq. (4). Assume X1 is finite.
(a) The coherent lower prevision P := inf{P1(P2) : P1 ≥ P 1, P2 ≥ P 2} is an independent product of P 1, P 2. As
a consequence, P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are coherent.
(b) P is an independent product if and only if it dominates both P 1(P 2) and P 2(P 1).
As a consequence, the independent natural extension P 1⊗P 2 is the smallest coherent lower prevision that dominates
both P 1(P 2) and P 2(P 1), and we deduce from Theorem 3 thatM(P 1 ⊗ P 2) =M(P 1(P 2)) ∩M(P 2(P 1)). In this
case, the proposition above guarantees that the intersection of the credal setsM(P 1(P 2)),M(P 2(P 1)) is always
non-empty, or, in other words, that two coherent lower previsions P 1, P 2 always have an independent product when
one of the possibility spaces is finite. This was mentioned without any proof in [24, Footnote 5 in Section 9.3].
Next, we study the connection between productivity and independence when one of the possibility spaces is finite.
We establish the following:
Proposition 6. Consider a coherent lower prevision P with marginals P 1, P 2, and assume X1 is finite. The following
are equivalent.
(a) P is productive.
(b) P is an independent product.
(c) P (f) ≥ max{minP 2(f |X1), inf P 1(f |X2)} ∀f ∈ L(X1 ×X2).
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This result, together with Proposition 4, allows us to deduce that when one of the possibility spaces is finite any
factorising coherent lower prevision P is an independent product of its marginals. To see that the converse is not true,
we refer to [12, Example 3].
From Theorem 3, any independent product (and in particular the independent natural extension) must dominate the
two concatenations P 1(P 2), P 2(P 1). Our next result characterises in which cases the independent natural extension
coincides with one of them:
Proposition 7. Consider P 1, P 2 coherent lower previsions on L(X1),L(X2), where X1 is finite, and let P 1 ⊗ P 2
denote their independent natural extension.
(a) P 1 ⊗ P 2 = P 1(P 2)⇔ P 1(P 2) ≥ P 2(P 1)⇔ P 1(P 2) productive⇔ P 2 linear or P 1 vacuous.
(b) P 1 ⊗ P 2 = P 2(P 1)⇔ P 2(P 1) ≥ P 1(P 2)⇔ P 2(P 1) productive⇔ P 1 linear or P 2 vacuous.
In fact, when one of the marginals (say, P 1) is linear, there is only one independent product: the concatenation
P 2(P1), because of Proposition 2(b). In particular, if the two marginals P1, P2 are linear, then it follows from the result
above that the two concatenations coincide P1(P2) = P2(P1) (remember that we are assuming in this section that X1 is
finite, so this poses no contradiction with Example 1). However, in general P 1 ⊗ P 2 need not be the only independent
product. Indeed, taking into account that coherence is preserved by taking lower envelopes, one natural way to obtain
independent products is to consider a family of independent linear products, and then take its lower envelope. This
produces the following definition:
Definition 7. Given two marginal coherent lower previsions P 1, P 2 with respective domains L(X1),L(X2), their
strong product is P 1  P 2(f) := inf{P1(P2(f)) : P1 ≥ P 1, P2 ≥ P 2} for every gamble f on X1 ×X2.
Taking into account our comments above, we have that P 1  P 2(f) := inf{P2(P1(f)) : P1 ≥ P 1, P2 ≥ P 2} for
every gamble f on X1 ×X2. The strong product was called type-1 product in [24, Section 9.3.5] and [3]. It has been
studied in a number of works in the literature [7, 12, 20] and it is a founding concept for credal networks [4]. It models
a notion of independence called strong independence that is more restrictive than the one considered so far, as we can
also see by the following result:
Proposition 8. Consider a coherent lower prevision P with marginals P 1, P 2.
(a) If P is the strong product of P 1, P 2, then it is an independent product.
(b) The strong product P 1  P 2 is factorising, and so is any coherent lower prevision P bounded between P 1 ⊗ P 2
and P 1  P 2.
Now we are able to show that the factorisation on positive gambles does not guarantee that a coherent lower
prevision is an independent product, and as a consequence nor does it imply that it is factorising.
Example 3. Consider X1 = X2 := {0, 1} and the following probability mass functions on {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}:















































Call Pi the linear prevision induced by pi; we define the lower envelope of the linear previsions created in that way as
P := min{P1, P2, P3, P4, P5}.
Note that the first four of these linear previsions satisfy stochastic independence, while the last one does not. Moreover,
if we consider the marginals P 1, P 2 of P , it can be checked that P 1  P 2 = min{P1, P2, P3, P4} ≥ P .
Now, for every f ∈ L+(X1), g ∈ L+(X2), we have that P 1  P 2(fg) ≤ P5(fg). To prove this, note that
P2(fg) > P5(fg)⇔ (f(1)− f(0))(g(0)− g(1)) > 0,
P3(fg) > P5(fg)⇔ (f(1)− f(0))(3g(0) + g(1)) > 0,
P4(fg) > P5(fg)⇔ (3f(0) + f(1))(g(1)− g(0)) > 0,
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and that these three equations are incompatible, taking into account that 3f(0) + f(1) and 3g(0) + g(1) are non-
negative. As a consequence, P (fg) = P 1  P 2(fg), and since the latter is a factorising coherent lower prevision by
Proposition 8, we conclude that P (fg) = P (f)P (g) for every f ∈ L+(X1), g ∈ L+(X2).
However, P is not factorising itself, because it is not an independent product. To see this, consider the gamble








Applying Proposition 5(b), we deduce that P is not an independent product. Then Proposition 6 implies that P is not
productive and from Proposition 4(b) we conclude that it is not factorising. 
The independent natural extension does not coincide with the strong product in general [24, Example 9.3.4]. Our
next result gives a sufficient condition for the equality between them:
Proposition 9. Consider marginal coherent lower previsions P 1 on L(X1) and P 2 on L(X2), where X1 is finite. If
either P 1 or P 2 is vacuous or linear, then P 1 ⊗ P 2 = P 1  P 2.
Recall that, from Proposition 7, we deduce that in this case the strong product (and the independent natural
extension) coincide with one of the concatenations of the marginals.
The following diagram summarises the implications when one of the possibility spaces is finite:
P factorising
⇓
P productive ⇐⇒ P independent product ⇐⇒ P ≥ P 1(P 2), P 2(P 1)
⇓
P satisfies (GBR) with P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1).
Next we show that when both X1,X2 are finite, the strong product is the greatest factorising independent product.
Proposition 10. Consider a coherent lower prevision P on L(X1 ×X2) with marginals P 1, P 2. If X1,X2 are finite
and P is factorising, then it is dominated by P 1  P 2.
This shows the incompatibility of the factorisation condition with an envelope-like theorem: not only the lower
envelope of a family of factorising linear previsions will not be factorising in general (it will only be so when it
produces the strong product), but also a factorising lower prevision (which by Proposition 8 will be any coherent lower
prevision bounded between the independent natural extension and the strong product) will not be the lower envelope of
the dominating factorising linear previsions, unless it coincides with the strong product.
5. Extension to the general case
In the previous section, we gave a simple characterisation of independent products of marginal coherent lower
previsions P 1, P 2 when one of the underlying possibility spaces is finite. Now we focus on the general case, where
both X1,X2 can be infinite. As we know from Example 1, in this case there may not be any independent product of two
marginals, not even in the linear case. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 8 (Compatibility). Two marginal coherent lower previsions P 1, P 2 on L(X1),L(X2) are called compatible
when they have an independent product.
Taking Example 1 into account, there are two main avenues we can pursue: one is establishing sufficient conditions
for the compatibility of the marginal coherent lower previsions P 1, P 2; the other is relaxing the definition of independent
product. With respect to the first path, we can establish the following:
Proposition 11. Consider two marginal coherent lower previsions P 1, P 2 on L(X1),L(X2). They are compatible
when any of the following conditions holds:
(a) Either P 1 or P 2 is vacuous.
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(b) Either X1 or X2 is finite.
(c) M(P 1(P 2)) ∩M(P 2(P 1)) 6= ∅ and P 1(x1) > 0, P 2(x2) > 0 for every x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2.
A sufficient condition for compatibility established by Walley in [24, Section 9.3.2] for linear marginals P1, P2 is
that their restrictions to events are countably additive. Indeed, if P 1, P 2 are the lower envelopes of countably additive
linear marginals they are always compatible: we can build the products of these linear marginals and then take their
lower envelope in order to obtain an independent product. However, note that coherent lower previsions are the lower
envelopes of sets of finitely additive previsions that need not be countably additive. We refer to [24, Section 6.9] for a
more detailed discussion of countable additivity and conditional lower previsions.
On the other hand, the existence of a factorising joint does not imply that the two marginals are compatible, because
if both referential spaces are infinite a factorising coherent lower prevision P need not be an independent product of its
marginals (it need not even dominate both concatenations P 1(P 2), P 2(P 1)). To prove this, it suffices to reconsider
Example 1. In that case, any of the concatenations P1(P2), P2(P1) is factorising; consider the former concatenation
(the remaining case is analogous):
P1(P2(f1f2|X1)) = P1(f1P2(f2|X1)) = P1(f1P2(f2)) = P1(f1)P2(f2),
P1(P2(g1g2|X1)) = P1(g1P2(g2|X1)) = P1(g1P2(g2)) = P1(g1)P2(g2),
for every f1 ∈ L+(X1), g1 ∈ L(X1), f2 ∈ L(X2), g2 ∈ L+(X2). Note that the first equality in both lines holds because
of Eq. (1), since f1 and g1 are X1-measurable (their positivity is actually not necessary for the result to hold given that
P2 is a linear prevision). This shows that P1(P2), and also P2(P1), are factorising. But we have seen that there are no
independent products of the marginal linear previsions P1, P2.
Next we discuss ways in which the notion of coherence in the definition of independent products can be relaxed.
One way is to consider the notion of weak coherence instead of that of coherence. This notion has been related
to the problem of the compatibility of marginal and conditional assessments and to satisfiability in [16, Section 8].
Taking into account Theorem 3, we see that a coherent lower prevision P is weakly coherent with the conditional
lower previsions P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) induced by its marginals and irrelevance if and only if it dominates the two
concatenations P 1(P 2), P 2(P 1). In spite of this nice result, we think that weak coherence may be indeed too weak
from the behavioural point of view, because it does not rule out some inconsistent assessments. See [24, Section 7.3.5]
for an example.
Another way in which we can weaken the notion of coherence is to consider Williams’ notion of coherence, as we
detail in the following section. This approach is closely related to Vicig’s study of independence in terms of conditional
events and gambles [23].
Remark 1. As we have mentioned in Footnote 1 of Section 2, our treatment of Williams’ coherence is more restrictive
than Williams’ original formulation: for, in order to make a comparison with Walley’s coherence, we are embedding
Williams’ coherence into Walley’s setup. As a consequence, our study of independence is, in this respect, more
restrictive than Vicig’s in [23], given that the latter employs Williams’ definition of coherence.
In particular, Williams’ coherence does not require the conditional lower previsions to be conditional on partitions,
but rather on conditional gambles of the type f |B that are assumed to be called off unless B is observed.
Using this idea, given two marginal coherent lower previsions P 1, P 2 with respective domains L(X1),L(X2), we
can use an assessment of irrelevance to define
P 1(f1|B2) := P 1(f1) ∀f1 X1-measurable, ∀B2 ⊆ X2
and
P 2(f2|B1) := P 2(f2) ∀f2 X2-measurable, ∀B1 ⊆ X1.
Then the conditional lower previsions we obtain in this manner would satisfy Williams’ definition of coherence and
this formulation would prevent the counterintuitive results we shall describe in Example 4 below. 
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5.1. W-independent products
Definition 9 (Williams independent product and natural extension). A coherent lower prevision P on L(X1 ×X2)
is said to be a W-independent product of its marginals P 1, P 2 when P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are W-coherent. The
smallest such product is called the W-independent natural extension.
Next, we establish that two marginal coherent lower previsions P 1, P 2 are always compatible if we consider
Williams’ notion of coherence:
Lemma 12. Consider two coherent lower previsions P 1, P 2 on L(X1),L(X2) and define P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) by
means of Eq. (4). Then P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are W-coherent.
This allows us to deduce the following:
Proposition 13. Consider a coherent lower prevision P on L(X1 ×X2) with marginals P 1, P 2.
(a) P is a W-independent product of its marginals⇔ it satisfies (GBR) with both P 1(·|X2) and P 2(·|X1).
(b) The W-independent natural extension of P 1, P 2 is given by
P (f) := sup{µ : f−µ ≥ G1(g|X2)+G2(h|X1) for some g, h ∈ L(X1×X2) such that S1(g), S2(h) are finite}
(5)
for any gamble f on X1 ×X2.
(c) If P is productive, then it is a W-independent product of its marginals.
Despite this result, we think that Williams’ notion of coherence is too weak to properly deal with independence in in-
finite spaces:5 on the one hand, and unlike Walley’s notion of coherence, P may be W-coherent with P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1)
and not have P 1, P 2 as marginals. To see this, it suffices to take into account that if P (x1) = P (x2) = 0 for every
x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2, then P satisfies (GBR) with any conditional lower previsions P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1): in fact,
P (xi) = 0 implies that P (Ixif) = P (Ixif) = 0 for all gambles f . This means that if we consider any marginal
coherent lower previsions P 1, P 2 and define P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) by irrelevance, P will be a W-independent product.
In particular, a linear prevision P on X1 × X2 that satisfies P (x1) = P (x2) = 0 for every x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2 is
a W-independent product of any marginal coherent lower previsions P 1, P 2. This shows that in the definition of
W-independent products we need to explicitly require that P 1, P 2 are the marginals of P .
However, even if we assume that P has marginals P 1, P 2, the W-coherence with P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) is still too
weak: for instance, if X1,X2 are infinite and we consider two linear previsions P1, P2 such that P1(x1) = P2(x2) = 0
for every x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2, then any linear prevision P with marginals P1, P2 will be a W-independent product,
which does not seem very reasonable. From this observation and Example 1 we can also deduce that W-independent
products are not necessarily independent products. Indeed, since W-coherence is less restrictive than Walley’s, we see
that the W-independent natural extension of P 1, P 2 is dominated by their independent natural extension, when the
latter exists. However, the W-independent natural extension may be too uninformative, as we show next:
Example 4. Consider two infinite spaces X1,X2, and let P 1, P 2 be two marginal coherent lower previsions. It follows
from Eq. (5) that P (f) = sup{inf[f −G1(g|X2)−G2(h|X1)] : g, h ∈ L(X1×X2) such that S1(g), S2(h) are finite}.
For any gambles g, h ∈ L(X1 × X2) with S1(g) = A2 finite and S2(h) = A1 finite, it holds that G1(g|X2) = 0 =
G2(h|X1) in Ac1×Ac2. Thus, inf[f −G1(g|X2)−G2(h|X1)] ≤ infAc1×Ac2 [f −G1(g|X2)−G2(h|X1)] = infAc1×Ac2 f .
As a consequence, P (f) ≤ sup{infAc1×Ac2 f : A1 ⊆ X1, A2 ⊆ X2 finite}. In particular, if we take X1 := X2 := N and
the gamble f given by f(n,m) := 1nm , it follows that P (f) = 0 irrespective of the marginal coherent lower previsions
P 1, P 2 we start with! 
Let us show that W-independent products need not be productive either:
5Again, assuming we consider conditional lower previsions on partitions, as in Walley’s framework; see Remark 1.
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Example 5. Consider two linear previsions P,Q on L(N) such that P ({n}) = 0 = Q({n}) for every n, P ({2n− 1 :
n ∈ N}) = 1 = Q({2n : n ∈ N}). Define X1 := X2 := N, P1 := P+Q2 , and P2(·|X1) as
P2(f |n) :=
{
P (f(n, ·)) if n odd,
Q(f(n, ·)) if n even.
Consider the coherent lower prevision Q′ := P1(P2(·|X1)). Its X1-marginal is P1. On the other hand, given an
X2-measurable gamble f ,
P ′(f) = P1({2n− 1 : n ∈ N})P (f) + P1({2n : n ∈ N})Q(f) = (P (f) +Q(f))/2 = P1(f).
From this we deduce that for every natural number n it is P ′({n}×N) = P ′(N×{n}) = 0, and as a consequence P ′ is a
W-independent product of its marginals. To prove that it is not productive, take f := Iodd ∈ L(X1), g := Ieven ∈ L(X2).
Then
P ′(f(g − P ′(g))) = P ′(fg)− P ′(f)P ′(g) = P ′((odd, even))− P1(odd)P1(even) = 0− 1
4
,
whence P ′ is not productive. 
The following diagram summarises the relationships between the different conditions for arbitrary X1,X2:
P factorising : P independent product
⇓ 6⇒ 6⇒ ⇓
P productive ⇐ P ≥ P 1(P 2), P 2(P 1)
⇓ 6⇒
P satisfies (GBR) with P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) ⇐⇒ P W-indep. product.
It is not difficult to find examples showing that the missing implications do not hold:
• [12, Example 3]: P productive, independent product; P factorising.
• Example 1: P factorising; P ≥ P 1(P 2), P 2(P 1). From this we deduce that P factorising; P independent
product and that P productive; P ≥ P 1(P 2), P 2(P 1).
• Example 5: P W-independent product; P productive.
There is only one open problem at this stage: we still need to establish whether any coherent lower prevision P that
dominates both concatenations P 1(P 2), P 2(P 1) of its marginals is an independent product. From Theorem 3, this will
be the case as soon as the two conditional lower previsions P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are coherent, that is, as soon as the
marginals P 1, P 2 are compatible. But it is still to be established whether the compatibility of P 1, P 2 is equivalent to
the credal setsM(P 1(P 2)),M(P 2(P 1)) having non-empty intersection. Our current conjecture is that this is not the
case: by Theorem 3, P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are weakly coherent if and only if there is some P ≥ P 1(P 2), P 2(P 1), so if
we had the implication it would follow that P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are weakly coherent if and only if they are coherent. It
follows from the discussion in [24, Section 7.3] that this is not the case in general, and at this moment we see no reason
why the equivalence should hold when the conditional lower previsions are defined by irrelevance.
5.2. Irrelevant products
Since W-independent products seem to be too weak to give a proper account of independence, we shall next
consider the case where we stick to Walley’s coherence but we only make an assumption of irrelevance of one of the
variables towards the other. This gives rise to the following notion:
Definition 10 (2-1 irrelevant product). Consider a coherent lower prevision P on L(X1×X2) with marginals P 1, P 2,
and define P 1(·|X2) by means of Eq. (4). We say that P is a 2-1 irrelevant product when it is coherent with P 1(·|X2).
It follows immediately from Theorem 3 that P is a 2-1 product of its marginals P 1, P 2 if and only if it dominates
P 2(P 1). This implies that the smallest 2-1 irrelevant product is given by the marginal extension P 2(P 1), which is
the generalisation of the law of total probability to the imprecise case. To see that this is not the only 2-1 irrelevant
product, consider the 2-1 strong product, given by S2-1(f) := min{P2(P1(f)) : P1 ≥ P 1, P2 ≥ P 2} for every




The study of independence is often regarded as relatively settled in the case of precise probability. The word
‘relatively’ accounts for the subtle issues originated by conditioning on events of probability zero and that are relevant
for finite spaces and even more for infinite ones. In the case of imprecise probability, the situation becomes more
complex, as there is more than one extension of the notion of independence (e.g., see the surveys [2, 7]). Interestingly,
one can uniformly address all the issues above, both in the precise and in the imprecise case, by a shift of paradigm
in the definition of independence. The work in [12] did in fact investigate this avenue by regarding an independent
product as a probabilistic model that is coherent with the assessments of mutual irrelevance between given variables.
That work also related this approach to the more traditional one based on some factorisation condition. However, the
study in [12] was restricted to the case of finite possibility spaces, an assumption that is not always met in practice—for
instance in statistical applications. In this paper, we have analysed this still largely unexplored side of independence by
considering the general case.
In particular, we have focused on the types of independent products that arise from two marginals using Walley’s
notion of coherence. We have showed that, contrary to the case of finite spaces, this type of independent product does
not always exist. This applies even to the case of precise probability and, in the imprecise case, also to well-established
notions such as strong independence. We have proved that we can nonetheless always build independent products
when one of the possibility spaces is finite, and that in that case one can characterise independent products by means
of a number of properties: productivity, which was employed in the derivation of the laws of large numbers in [9];
weak coherence, which is a weaker version of Walley’s consistency axiom that has been related to satisfiability in [16];
and more generally we have proven that a joint model is an independent product if and only if it dominates the two
concatenations of its marginals.
Since independent products do not exist in general, we have investigated two alternative models that guarantee their
existence. On the one hand, we have considered the notion of coherence proposed by Williams, which in our opinion
proves too weak to give a proper account of independence; on the other, we have considered a single assumption of
irrelevance of one variable to the other (instead of both as in the case of independence), and showed that in that case
we can use the extension to imprecision of the law of total probability to establish the joint model. Nevertheless, our
study of Williams’ coherence has assumed that lower previsions are conditional on partitions of the possibility space,
which is only required in Walley’s formulation. A more general approach, briefly discussed in Remark 1, might make it
possible to define also informative products in the infinite case. A thorough study of this avenue of research is left as an
open problem.
Note also that we have characterised the strong product as the greatest factorising product of given marginals, when
all the possibility spaces are finite. It is a small step to extend our proof to the case of n variables, and this allows to
close a few open problems from [12]: we deduce that the strong product is the greatest joint model satisfying other
conditions of interest, such as strong factorisation and strong Kuznetsov independence; that any factorising model
satisfies the condition of external additivity; and that we can characterise factorising models as those lying between the
independent natural extension and the strong product.
With respect to the open problems remaining from the analysis we have carried out in this paper, we point out three:
one of them is the characterisation of independent products as models that dominate the two concatenations; if this held
we would have an easy way to verify if a joint model is an independent product, and we would deduce the equivalence
between weak coherence and coherence in this context. Another open problem would be the quest for other sufficient
conditions for the existence of an independent product of two marginals. Although we have already provided a few in
this paper, it would be interesting to determine other conditions, for instance in terms of envelope theorems. Finally, in
some other works [18, 27] we have argued that there are cases where Walley’s coherence notion should be strengthened
into what we have called conglomerable coherence. We prove in Appendix B that when one possibility space is finite
Walley’s notion and conglomerable coherence coincide for the two conditionals defined by irrelevance, so that the
analysis in this paper covers already such an extension. For the case where both spaces are infinite, we give a number
of quite stringent sufficient conditions for the equality and yet it is an open problem to prove necessity at this point.
Last, since the applications of independence are widespread, we would like to study if our results can be employed
to simplify the combination of marginal models in some problems of interest. We believe, for instance, that our new
formulation of the independent natural extension in Theorem 3 has quite some potential to impact on algorithms and
applications, with special regard to graphical models.
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Appendix A. Proofs and technical results
Proof of Theorem 3. (a) We begin with the direct implication. If P , P 1(·|X2) are coherent, then P must dominate
the smallest coherent lower prevision with marginal P 2 that is coherent with P 1(·|X2). By Proposition 2(a), this
is given by P 2(P 1).
Conversely, if P dominates P 2(P 1), then given a gamble f in L(X1×X2) it holds that P (G1(f |X2)) = P (f −
P 1(f |X2)) ≥ P 2(P 1(f − P 1(f |X2)|X2)) = P 2(P 1(f |X2)− P 1(f |X2)) = 0, where the penultimate passage
holds because P 1(f |X2) is X2-measurable. In particular, it follows that P (G1(f |x2)) ≥ 0 for every x2 ∈ X2,
and P (G1(fIA|X2)) ≥ 0 for all A ⊆ X2. Assume ex-absurdo that there is some gamble h on X1×X2 and some
x2 ∈ X2 such that P (G1(h|x2)) > 0. Then if we define the X1-measurable gamble g by g(x′1, x′2) := h(x′1, x2)
for every (x′1, x
′
2) ∈ X1 × X2, we obtain that P (G1(g|x2)) > 0 and P (G1(gIxc2 |X2)) ≥ 0. It follows that
P (G1(g|X2)) ≥ P (G1(gIx2 |X2)) + P (G1(gIxc2 |X2)) = P (G1(g|x2)) + P (G1(gIxc2 |X2)) > 0, while on
the other hand G1(g|X2)(x′1, x′2) = h(x′1, x2) − P 1(h(·, x2)) for every (x′1, x′2) ∈ X1 × X2, and therefore
P (G1(g|X2)) = P 1(h(·, x2)− P 1(h(·, x2))) = 0, taking into account that P 1 is the marginal of P . This is a
contradiction. We deduce thus that P (G1(f |x2)) = 0 for every gamble f on X1 ×X2 and every x2 ∈ X2. Since
P , P 1(·|X2) satisfy (CNG) and (GBR), we deduce from Proposition 1 that they are coherent.
(b) This follows from the first statement and the equivalence between weak coherence and pairwise coherence
established in [16, Theorem 1].
(c) By the reduction theorem in [24, Theorem 7.1.5], P is an independent product of P 1, P 2 if and only if
P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are weakly coherent and P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are coherent. From the second statement,
the weak coherence of P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) holds if and only if P ≥ max{P 1(P 2), P 2(P 1)}. On the other
hand, if there is some coherent lower prevision Q that is coherent with P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1), we deduce in
particular that these two conditional lower previsions are coherent. Thus, the smallest independent product
P 1 ⊗ P 2 is the smallest coherent lower prevision that dominates both P 1(P 2), P 2(P 1). As a consequence, its
credal setM(P 1 ⊗ P 2) is the greatest credal set included inM(P 1(P 2)) ∩M(P 2(P 1)). Since the latter is a
weak *-compact and convex set of linear previsions, we deduce thatM(P 1⊗P 2) =M(P 1(P 2))∩M(P 2(P 1)).
Lemma 14. Consider a coherent lower prevision P on L(X1 × X2), with marginals P 1, P 2. The following are
equivalent:
(a1) P (f1(f2 − P (f2))) ≥ 0 ∀f1 ∈ L+(X1), f2 ∈ L(X2).
(a2) P (f1f2) ≥ P (f1P (f2)) ∀f1 ∈ L+(X1), f2 ∈ L(X2).
(a3) P (A1(f2 − P 2(f2))) = 0 ∀A1 ⊆ X1, f2 ∈ X2.
Similarly, the following are equivalent:
(b1) P (f2(f1 − P (f1))) ≥ 0 ∀f1 ∈ L(X1), f2 ∈ L+(X2).
(b2) P (f2f1) ≥ P (f2P (f1)) ∀f1 ∈ L(X1), f2 ∈ L+(X2).
(b3) P (A2(f1 − P 1(f1))) = 0 ∀A2 ⊆ X2, f1 ∈ X1.
Proof. Let us make a circular proof of the equivalence (a1)⇔ (a2)⇔ (a3). The proof of the equivalence (b1)⇔ (b2)
⇔ (b3) is analogous.
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(a1)⇒(a2) Consider f1 ∈ L+(X1), f2 ∈ L(X2). Then P (f1f2) ≥ P (f1(f2 − P (f2))) + P (f1P (f2)) ≥ P (f1P (f2)),
where the first inequality follows from the super-additivity of P and the second from (a1).
(a2)⇒(a3) GivenA1 ⊆ X1 and f2 ∈ L(X2), condition (a2) implies that P (A1(f2−P (f2))) ≥ P (A1(P (f2−P (f2)))) = 0,
where the equality follows from [24, Proposition 2.6.1(b,c)]. In particular, we also have that P (Ac1(f2 −
P (f2))) ≥ 0, and since 0 = P (f2−P (f2)) ≥ P (A1(f2−P (f2))) +P (Ac1(f2−P (f2))) ≥ 0, we deduce that
P (A1(f2 − P (f2))) = 0.
(a3)⇒(a1) Consider f1 ∈ L+(X1), f2 ∈ L(X2). If f1 is simple, f1 =
∑n
i=1 xiIAi , it follows from super-additivity that
P (f1(f2 −P (f2))) = P ((
∑n
i=1 xiIAi)(f2 −P (f2))) = P (
∑n
i=1 xiIAi(f2 −P (f2))) ≥
∑n
i=1 xiP (Ai(f2 −
P (f2))) = 0. On the other hand, given f1 ∈ L+(X1), there is a sequence (hn)n∈N of simple gambles in L+(X1)
that converges uniformly towards f1. As a consequence, the sequence (hn(f2−P (f2)))n∈N converges uniformly
towards f1(f2 − P (f2)), and since coherent lower previsions are continuous under uniform convergence by [24,
Theorem 2.6.1(`)], P (f1(f2 − P (f2))) = limn→∞ P (hn(f2 − P (f2))) ≥ 0.
Lemma 15. Consider a coherent lower prevision P on L(X1 ×X2), with marginals P 1, P 2. Then
P ≥ P 1(P 2)⇒ P (f1(f2 − P (f2))) ≥ 0 ∀f1 ∈ L+(X1), f2 ∈ L(X2),
and similarly
P ≥ P 2(P 1)⇒ P (f2(f1 − P (f1))) ≥ 0 ∀f1 ∈ L(X1), f2 ∈ L+(X2).
Proof. Let us prove the first equation; the proof of the second is similar. Consider f1 ∈ L+(X1), f2 ∈ L(X2). Then
P (f1(f2−P (f2))) ≥ P 1(P 2(f1(f2−P (f2)))) = P 1(f1P 2(f2−P 2(f2))) = P 1(f1 ·0) = 0, where the first equality
follows from Eq. (1).
Proof of Proposition 4. (a) This follows from the equivalences (a1)⇔(a2)⇔(a3) and (b1)⇔(b2)⇔(b3) established
in Lemma 14.
(b) Use the equivalence between the first and the third statements in (a).
(c) Use Lemma 15.
(d) This follows immediately using the equivalences (a1)⇔(a3) and (b1)⇔(b3) from Lemma 14, considering the
particular cases of A1 := {x1}, A2 := {x2}.
Lemma 16. Consider marginal linear previsions P1, P2, and define P1(·|X2), P2(·|X1) by irrelevance. Assume X1 is
finite. Then:
(a) P1(P2) = P2(P1).
(b) P1(·|X2), P2(·|X1) are coherent.
(c) P1(P2) = P2(P1) is the only independent product of P1, P2.
Proof. (a) By Proposition 2(b), the smallest (and in this case, the only) coherent lower prevision with X2-marginal
P2 that is in addition coherent with P1(·|X2) is given by the concatenation P2(P1). Let us show that P2(P1)
is also coherent with P2(·|X1). Since X1 is finite, this holds if and only if P2(P1), P2(·|X1) satisfy (GBR).
Consider thus a gamble f on X1 × X2, x1 ∈ X1. It holds that P2(P1(Ix1(f − P2(f |x1)))) = P2(P1(Ix1(g −
P2(g)))) = P2((g − P2(g))P1(x1)) = P1(x1)(P2(g − P2(g))) = 0, where the gamble g in L(X2) is given by
g(x2) := f(x1, x2). Thus, P2(P1), P2(·|X1) are coherent, and applying Proposition 2(b), P2(P1) must coincide
with P1(P2), which is the only linear prevision that is coherent with P2(·|X1).
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(b) Since P1(·|X2), P2(·|X1) are linear, they are coherent if and only if for every pair of gambles f, g ∈ L(X1×X2),
there exists some B ∈ S1(f) ∪ S2(g) such that 6
sup
ω∈B
[G1(f |X2) +G2(g|X1)](ω) ≥ 0. (A.1)
Fix gambles f, g; in order to simplify the notation, let h denote the gamble G1(f |X2) +G2(g|X1). If suph > 0,
then there must be some B ∈ S1(f) ∪ S2(g) such that supω∈B h(ω) > 0, so Eq. (A.1) holds. On the other hand,
if S2(g) = ∅, then Eq. (A.1) follows from the separate coherence of P1(·|X2).
Assume next that S2(g) 6= ∅ and that supB h < 0 for every B ∈ S1(f) ∪ S2(g), whence suph ≤ 0. Consider
x1 ∈ S2(g), and denoteBx1 := {x1}×X2. Consider also the linear prevision P := P1(P2) = P2(P1). It follows
from the first statement and Theorem 3(a) that this linear prevision is coherent with each of P1(·|X2), P2(·|X1).
If supω∈Bx1 h(ω) = −δ < 0, then P (h) = P (Bx1h) + P (Bcx1h) ≤ −δP (Bx1), using that h ≤ −δ on
Bx1 and h ≤ 0 on Bcx1 . On the other hand, the coherence of P, P1(·|X2) implies, via Proposition 1, that
P (G1(f |X2)) ≥ 0, and similarly the coherence of P, P2(·|X1) implies that P (G2(g|X1)) ≥ 0. Applying the
linearity of P , we deduce that P (G1(f |X2) +G2(g|X1)) = P (G1(f |X2)) + P (G2(g|X1)) ≥ 0. We conclude
that
P (Bx1) = P1(x1) = 0 for every x1 ∈ S2(g). (A.2)
Consider now x2 ∈ S1(f), and let supX1×{x2} h = −ε < 0. The equality P (G1(f |x2)) = 0 implies that there
must be some x1 ∈ X1 such that G1(f |x2)(x1, x2) ≥ − ε2 , and we can assume without loss of generality that
P1(x1) > 0, because 0 = P (G1(f |x2)) =
∑
x1∈X1,P1(x1)>0,G1(f |x2)(x1,x2)≥− ε2 P1(x1)(G1(f |x2)(x1, x2)) +∑
x1∈X1,P1(x1)>0,G1(f |x2)(x1,x2)<− ε2 P1(x1)(G1(f |x2)(x1, x2)).
Fix this x1. Since h(x1, x2) = [G1(f |X2) + G2(g|X1)](x1, x2) ≤ −ε < − ε2 ≤ G1(f |x2)(x1, x2), it must be
G2(g|X1)(x1, x2) < 0, whence x1 ∈ S2(g). Thus, we have found an element in the support S2(g) with positive
probability. This contradicts Eq. (A.2). As a consequence, P1(·|X2), P2(·|X1) are coherent.
(c) By Proposition 2(b), P1(P2) is the only coherent lower prevision that is coherent with P2(·|X1) and has marginal
P1, and P2(P1) is the only coherent lower prevision that is coherent with P1(·|X2) and has marginal P2. Since
by the first statement P1(P2) = P2(P1) =: P , we deduce that this linear prevision is the only one to be weakly
coherent with P2(·|X1), P1(·|X2). Applying the second statement, we conclude that P, P2(·|X1), P1(·|X2) are
coherent and that P is the only independent product.
Proof of Proposition 5. (a) Consider P1 ≥ P 1, P2 ≥ P 2. By Lemma 16, P1(P2), P1(·|X2), P2(·|X1) are coherent.
Since P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are the lower envelopes of the family {P1(·|X2), P2(·|X1) : P1 ≥ P 1, P2 ≥ P 2}, the
envelope theorem in [24, Theorem 7.1.6] implies that P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are coherent with P := inf{P1(P2) :
P1 ≥ P 1, P2 ≥ P 2}.
(b) Applying the reduction theorem [24, Theorem 7.1.5], P is an independent product of its marginals if and
only if P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are coherent and P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are weakly coherent. The first of these two
conditions follows from the first statement. The equivalence between the statement in (b) and weak coherence
follows from Theorem 3.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let us make a circular proof.
(a)⇒(b) Since by Proposition 5(a) the conditional lower previsions P 1(·|X2) and P 2(·|X1) are coherent, it follows from
the reduction theorem in [24, Theorem 7.1.5] that P is an independent product of its marginals P 1, P 2 if and
only if P , P 1(·|X2), P 1(·|X1) are weakly coherent. By [16, Theorem 1], this weak coherence is equivalent to
the pairwise coherence of P , P 1(·|X2) on the one hand, and of P , P 2(·|X1) on the other. By Proposition 4, if P
6The equivalence between this condition and Eq. (2) follows from the fact that for any conditional linear prevision P (·|B) it holds that
G(−f |B) = −G(f |B), and also G(f |B) +G(g|B) = G(f + g|B). Recall also that we are using in this paper Walley’s approach, whence a linear
conditional prevision is conglomerable, unlike those considered by de Finetti in [14].
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is productive, it satisfies (GBR) with both these conditional lower previsions. Since X1 is finite, we deduce in
particular that P , P 2(·|X1) are coherent. Thus, the only thing we need to show is that P , P 1(·|X2) satisfy (CNG),
that is, that for every gamble f ∈ L(X1 ×X2) it holds that P (G1(f |X2)) ≥ 0. Fix then f ∈ L(X1 ×X2).
Assume first that the set of gambles {f(·, x2) : x2 ∈ X2} ⊆ L(X1) is finite and of size n. Let us denote these
gambles by g1, . . . , gn ∈ L(X1). Then we can define a partition of X2 by the sets B1, . . . , Bn, where Bi :=
{x2 ∈ X2 : f(·, x2) = gi}. As a consequence, G1(f |X2)(x1, x2) =
∑n
i=1 IBi(x2)(gi(x1) − P 1(gi)) ∀x1 ∈
X1, x2 ∈ X2. Applying the super-additivity and productivity of P , we deduce that









P (Bi(gi − P 1(gi))) ≥ 0.
Next, given an arbitrary gamble f , there exists some natural number k such that −k ≤ inf f ≤ sup f ≤ k. For
every n, there exists a finite partition Bn := {In1 , . . . , Inkn} of [−k, k] with intervals Inj of length smaller than 1n .
Let us define the gamble fn onX1×X2 by fn(x1, x2) := inf Inj if f(x1, x2) ∈ Inj , for every (x1, x2) ∈ X1×X2.
Then since the partition Bn is finite, the set {fn(·, x2) : x2 ∈ X2} ⊆ L(X1) is finite. Moreover, by construction
|fn(x1, x2) − f(x1, x2)| ≤ 1n for every (x1, x2) ∈ X1 × X2, from which we deduce that |G1(fn|X2) −
G1(f |X2)| ≤ 2n for all (x1, x2) ∈ X1 × X2. We see then that the sequence (G1(fn|X2))n∈N converges
uniformly towards G1(f |X2). By [24, Theorem 2.6.1(`)], P (G1(f |X2)) = limn→∞ P (G1(fn|X2)) ≥ 0. This
implies that P , P 1(·|X2) are coherent and as a consequence that P is an independent product.
(b)⇒(c) If P is an independent product, it follows from the characterisation of coherence in [24, Theorem 6.5.2] that for
every gamble f it must be P (f) ≥ minP 2(f |X1) and P (f) ≥ inf P 1(f |X2).
(c)⇒(a) Consider A1 ⊆ X1, a gamble f2 ∈ X2 and let IA1(f2 −P 2(f2)) ∈ L(X1 ×X2). Then P (IA1(f2 −P 2(f2))) ≥
minP 2(IA1(f2 − P 2(f2))|X1) = min[IA1P 2(f2 − P 2(f2))] = 0, where the penultimate passage follows
from Eq. (1). Similarly, P (IAc1(f2 − P 2(f2))) ≥ 0 and since 0 = P (f2 − P 2(f2)) ≥ P (IA1(f2 − P 2(f2))) +
P (IAc1(f2 − P 2(f2))), it must be P (IA1(f2 − P 2(f2))) = 0. An analogous reasoning allows us to deduce that
P (IA2(f1−P 1(f1))) = 0 for every A2 ⊆ X2 and every gamble f1 on X1. Applying Proposition 4(a) we deduce
that P is productive.
Proof of Proposition 7. First of all, by Proposition 5(b) the independent natural extension P 1 ⊗ P 2 is the smallest
coherent lower prevision that dominates the two concatenations P 1(P 2), P 2(P 1). Hence, it coincides with one of them
if and only if this concatenation dominates the other one.
On the other hand, Proposition 6 implies that a concatenation is an independent product if and only if it is productive,
and by Proposition 5 it is an independent product if and only if it coincides with the independent natural extension.
Let us establish now the remaining equivalences.
(a) If P 2 is linear, then P 1(P2) is the only coherent lower prevision with marginal P 1 that is coherent with P2(·|X1),
and as a consequence it coincides with the independent natural extension.
If P 1 is vacuous, then it is easy to prove that P 2(f |x1) ≥ P 2(P 1(f)) for every gamble f on X1 × X2 and
every x1 ∈ X1. This implies that infx1∈X1 P 2(f |x1) ≥ P 2(P 1(f |X2)), or, in other words, that P 1(P 2(f)) ≥
P 2(P 1(f)). Applying Proposition 5(b) (which is where the finiteness of X1 comes into play), we obtain that
P 1(P 2) is an independent product. That it is the smallest one follows trivially because if there were a smaller one,
then it could not dominate P 1(P 2). We deduce that P 1(P 2) coincides with the independent natural extension.
We turn now to the other implication. Assume ex-absurdo that P 1 is not vacuous and P 2 is non-linear. Then
there are subsets A1 ⊆ X1, A2 ⊆ X2 such that P 1(A1) ∈ (0, 1) [11, Theorem 8] (because P 1 is non-
vacuous) and P 2(A2) < P 2(A2) [24, Corollary 3.2.3] (because P 2 is non-linear). Then Eq. (1) implies
that G1(IA1×A2 |X2) = IA2(IA1 − P 1(A1)) = IA2G1(A1), and it is easy to prove that P 2(IA2G1(A1)|X1) =
G1(A1)(P 2(A2)IA1 + P 2(A2)IAc1). Taking this into account, we deduce that
P 1(P 2(G1(IA1×A2 |X2))|X1) ≤ P1(G1(A1)(P 2(A2)IA1 + P 2(A2)IAc1)),
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where P1 ≥ P 1 is a linear prevision satisfying P1(A1) = P 1(A1) ∈ (0, 1), so that G1(A1) = A1 − P 1(A1) =
A1−P1(A1). Since P1(G1(A1)(P 2(A2)IA1 +P 2(A2)IAc1)) = P1(A1)(1−P1(A1))(P 2(A2)−P 2(A2)) < 0,
we deduce that P 1(P 2(G1(IA1×A2 |X2))) < 0 and therefore P 1(P 2) is not coherent with P 1(·|X2). Thus, it is
not an independent product and in particular it does not coincide with the independent natural extension.
(b) The proof is analogous to that of the first statement.
Proof of Proposition 8. (a) This is actually point (a) of Proposition 5.
(b) Let us show that the strong product P 1  P 2 is factorising. Consider gambles f1 ∈ L+(X1), f2 ∈ L(X2), and
let us show that (P 1  P 2)(f1f2) = P 1(f1P 2(f2)) (the other case is similar). Since from the first statement
the strong product is an independent product, it dominates P 1(P 2), and consequently (P 1  P 2)(f1f2) ≥
P 1(P 2(f1f2)) = P 1(f1P 2(f2)), where the equality follows from Eq. (1). Consider on the other hand a
linear prevision P2 ≥ P 2 such that P2(f2) = P 2(f2), and another linear prevision P1 ≥ P 1 such that
P1(f1P 2(f2)) = P 1(f1P 2(f2)). Then by construction (P 1  P 2)(f1f2) ≤ P1(P2(f1f2)) = P1(f1P2(f2)) =
P1(f1P 2(f2)) = P 1(f1P 2(f2)), whence (P 1  P 2)(f1f2) = P 1(f1P 2(f2)). Thus, P 1  P 2 is factorising.
Next, assume that P 1⊗P 2 ≤ P ≤ P 1P 2. Consider gambles f1 ∈ L+(X1), f2 ∈ L(X2), and let us show that
P (f1f2) = P 1(f1P 2(f2)) (the other case is similar). Then P (f1f2) ≥ (P 1 ⊗ P 2)(f1f2) ≥ P 1(P 2(f1f2)) =
P 1(f1P 2(f2)), using again Eq. (1), and on the other hand P (f1f2) ≤ (P 1  P 2)(f1f2) = P 1(f1P 2(f2)),
taking into account that P 1  P 2 is factorising. Thus, P (f1f2) = P 1(f1P 2(f2)), and from this we deduce that
P is factorising.
Proof of Proposition 9. Consider a gamble f on X1 ×X2. Assume for instance that P 2 is vacuous, so that P 1 ⊗ P 2 =
P 2(P 1) by Proposition 7. Then for every ε > 0 there exists some x2 ∈ X2 such that P 1(f |x2) ≤ infx2∈X2 P 1(f |x2)+
ε = P 2(P 1(f)) + ε.
Let P2 be the linear prevision associated with the degenerate distribution on x2. Then P2 ∈ M(P 2) because
P 2 is vacuous. Take P1 ∈ M(P 1) such that P1(f(·, x2)) = P 1(f(·, x2)). Then by definition of the strong product
(P 1  P 2)(f) ≤ P2(P1(f |X2)) = P1(f(·, x2)) = P 1(f |x2) ≤ P 2(P 1(f)) + ε = (P 1 ⊗ P 2)(f) + ε. Since this
holds for every ε > 0 we deduce that P 1  P 2 ≤ P 1 ⊗ P 2 and as a consequence they are equal. The proof of the
equality when P 1 is vacuous is analogous.
Finally, the equality when one of the marginals (say, P 1) is linear follows from Proposition 2(b).
Proof of Proposition 10. LetMi denote the set of exposed points ofM(P i), i = 1, 2. It follows from Straszewicz’s
theorem [21] thatM(P i) equals the closed convex hull ofMi for i = 1, 2, whence P i = infMi for i = 1, 2 and as a
consequence
P 1  P 2 = inf{P1(P2) : Pi ∈M(P i)} = inf{P1(P2) : Pi ∈Mi}. (A.3)
What we want to show is that P ≤ P1(P2) for every P1 ∈M1, P2 ∈M2. Consider then Pi ∈Mi, i = 1, 2. By
definition of exposed point there is some gamble fi ∈ L(Xi) such that P i(fi) = Pi(fi) < P ′i (fi) for every P ′i 6= Pi in
M(P i). Moreover, using the constant additivity of coherent lower previsions established in [24, Thm. 2.6.1(c)], we
can assume without loss of generality that min fi > 0.
If P is a factorising lower prevision, then it must satisfy P (f1f2) = P (f1P (f2)) = P 1(f1)P 2(f2) for any
pair of non-negative gambles f1, f2, and as a consequence there must be some linear prevision P ≥ P such that
P (f1f2) = P 1(f1)P 2(f2) = P1(f1)P2(f2). Let us show that it must be P = P1(P2).
Since X1,X2 are finite, we can write P = P (P (·|X1)), where P (·|x1) is derived from P by Bayes’ rule when
P (x1) > 0 and can be defined arbitrarily otherwise. Moreover, since P ≥ P and the latter is an independent product
because it is factorising, it follows that P (f |x1) ≥ P (f |x1) = P 2(f |x1) = P 2(f(x1, ·)) for every f ∈ L(X1 ×X2)
and every x1 ∈ X1, where the first equality holds because P is coherent with P 2(·|X1). As a consequence, P (f1f2) =
P (P (f1f2|X1)) = P (f1P (f2|X1)) ≥ P (f1P (f2)) = P (f1)P (f2) = P (f1)P (f2), and we can only have the equality
provided that P (f2|x1) = P2(f2) whenever P (x1) > 0, because min f1 > 0. But since P (·|x1) ∈ M(P 2), the
equality above can only hold provided that P (·|x1) = P2 for every x1 ∈ X1 with P1(x1) > 0. Since we can define
P (·|x1) arbitrarily when P (x1) = 0, we deduce that P (·|X1) must be constant on P2.
A similar reasoning shows that P (·|X2) must be constant on P1, whence P1 must be the X1-marginal of P .
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From this we deduce that P = P (P (·|X1)) = P1(P2). Therefore, P ≤ P1(P2) for every P1 ∈ M1, P2 ∈ M2,
and applying Eq. (A.3) we deduce that P ≤ P 1  P 2.
Proof of Proposition 11. (a) By [24, Section 7.3.7], P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are coherent whenever any of them is
vacuous. If for instance P 1 is vacuous, then we can reason as in the proof of Proposition 7(a) and establish that
P 1(P 2) ≥ P 2(P 1). Then Theorem 3 and the reduction theorem in [24, Theorem 7.1.5] imply that P 1(P 2) is an
independent product of P 1, P 2.
(b) This is Proposition 5(a).
(c) IfM(P 1(P 2))∩M(P 2(P 1)) 6= ∅, then it follows from Theorem 3 that the lower envelope P ofM(P 1(P 2))∩
M(P 2(P 1)) 6= ∅ is a coherent lower prevision that is weakly coherent with P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1). Moreover, by
construction the marginals of P dominate P 1, P 2, whence P (x1) > 0, P (x2) > 0 for every x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2.
In that case, we can apply [15, Theorem 11] to deduce that P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are coherent, and in particular
that P 1, P 2 are compatible.
Next we state an extension of a couple of results from Walley’s theory ([24, Theorem 7.1.5] and [16, Theorem 1])
to Williams’ notion of coherence. The proof is analogous to those of these results.
Proposition 17. Let P be a coherent lower prevision on L(X1 × X2) and consider conditional lower previsions
P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1).
(a) P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are W-coherent⇔ P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are W-coherent and P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are
weakly W-coherent.
(b) P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are weakly W-coherent if and only if P , P 1(·|X2) and P , P 2(·|X1) are both W-coherent.
Proof of Lemma 12. Consider first of all the case of linear P1, P2. They are W-coherent if and only if for every
g, h ∈ L(X1 ×X2) with finite support it holds that
sup
S1(g)∪S2(h)
G1(g|X2) +G2(h|X1) ≥ 0. (A.4)








P1(P2(G2(h|x1))) ≥ 0. (A.5)
Assume that the supremum in (A.4) is equal to−δ < 0. This means that G1(g|X2)+G2(h|X1) ≤ −δ over S1(g)∪
S2(h) and it equals zero elsewhere; whence the only possibility for (A.5) to hold is that P1(P2(S1(g) ∪ S2(h))) = 0,
whence P2(S1(g)) = 0 = P1(S2(h)). For a given (fixed) x1 ∈ S2(h), the separate coherence of P2(·|X1) implies
that the set Ax1 := {x2 ∈ X2 : G2(h|X1)(x1, x2) ≥ − δ2} is non-empty. Let us show that any x2 ∈ Ax1 must
belong to S1(g) too. Assume by contradiction that there is x2 ∈ Ax1 \ S1(g). Then G1(g|X2)(x1, x2) = 0 while
G2(h|X1)(x1, x2) ≥ − δ2 , since x1 ∈ S2(h) and x2 ∈ Ax1 . From this we obtain that the supremum in (A.4) is greater
than or equal to − δ2 , which contradicts our assumption that it is equal to −δ. We deduce that any x2 ∈ Ax1 belongs to
S1(g), whence P2(Ax1) = 0. Define now the gamble f on X1 ×X2 by f(x′1, x′2) := h(x1, x′2) ∀(x′1, x′2) ∈ X1 ×X2.
This gamble is X2-measurable, so P2(f) = P (h(x1, ·)) = P (h|x1). Moreover, 0 = P2(f) − P2(f) = P2(f −




x1) = − δ2 < 0, which is a contradiction. As a
consequence, the supremum in (A.4) is non-negative and P1(·|X2), P2(·|X1) are W-coherent.
Now, given coherent lower previsions P 1, P 2, the conditional lower previsions P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) they induce by
irrelevance are the lower envelopes of the family of conditional linear previsions {P1(·|X2), P2(·|X1) : P1 ≥ P 1, P2 ≥
P 2}. Since W-coherence is preserved by taking lower envelopes [25, Theorem 2], we deduce that the conditional lower
previsions P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are coherent.
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Proof of Proposition 13. (a) From Proposition 17 and Lemma 12 P is a W-independent product of its marginals
P 1, P 2 if and only if P , P 1(·|X2) are W-coherent and P , P 2(·|X1) are W-coherent. By [22, p. 363], this is
equivalent to P satisfying (GBR) with both P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1).
(b) Let us show that P is the smallest coherent lower prevision that satisfies (GBR) with both P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1).
The coherence of P follows from its definition and from the separate coherence of P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1). Let
us prove next that P satisfies (GBR) with P 1(·|X2) (the proof for P 2(·|X1) is similar). Consider a gamble f
on X1 × X2 and x2 ∈ X2. Then by choosing g := Ix2f , h := 0 in Eq. (5) we obtain that P (G1(f |x2)) ≥ 0.
If it were P (G1(f |x2)) > 0, then there would be some µ > 0 and gambles g, h with finite support such that
G1(f |x2)− µ ≥ G1(g|X2) +G2(h|X1), a contradiction with the W-coherence of P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) that has
been established in Lemma 12.
Consider now another coherent lower prevision Q that satisfies (GBR) with both P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1). If there is
some gamble f on X1 ×X2 and some ε > 0 such that Q(f) + ε < P (f), then by Eq. (5) there are gambles g, h
with finite supports such that f−Q(f)−ε ≥ G1(g|X2)+G2(h|X1), whence−ε ≥ G1(g|X2)+G2(h|X1)−(f−
Q(f)), and thus Q is not W-coherent with P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1), a contradiction. Thus, P is the W-independent
natural extension of P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1).
(c) This is a consequence of the first statement and point (d) in Proposition 4.
Appendix B. Conglomerably coherent independent products
In [18], we argued that Walley’s definition of coherence may be too weak to fully capture the behavioural
implications of given assessments, and that if we accept Walley’s conglomerative principle we should use the notion of
conglomerable coherence instead. In this appendix, we study what kind of independent products are originated by such
a more stringent notion of coherence. In order to do this, we must first give a number of preliminary notions. We start
with a notion of coherence, originally put forward by Williams [25], for sets of so-called desirable gambles:
Definition 11 (Coherence for gambles). Let R ⊆ L(Ω) be a set of gambles. We consider the following rationality
axioms for desirability:
D1. L+(Ω) ⊆ R.
D2. 0 /∈ R.
D3. f ∈ R, λ > 0⇒ λf ∈ R.
D4. f, g ∈ R ⇒ f + g ∈ R.
A set of gamblesR satisfying these four axioms is called coherent, and its elements desirable.
It follows from these axioms that if f belongs to a coherent set of gamblesR and g ≥ f , then it must be g ∈ R.
One particular coherent set of desirable gambles is the set of strictly desirable gambles induced by a coherent lower
prevision P , which is given by
R := L+ ∪ {f ∈ L : P (f) > 0}.
Walley developed his theory on top of Williams’, in particular by introducing a further axiom, besides D1–D4,
which has to do with a property of conglomerability of an uncertainty model:
Definition 12 (Conglomerability for gambles). LetR be a coherent set of desirable gambles and B a partition of Ω.
R is called B-conglomerable when it satisfies the following axiom:
D5. f ∈ L, Bf ∈ R ∪ {0} for all B ∈ B ⇒ f ∈ R ∪ {0}.
Observe that D5 is a consequence of D4 when B is finite.
The notion of conglomerability is at the basis of the following definition [19]:
Definition 13 (Conglomerable natural extension for gambles). Given a set of desirable gamblesR and a partition B
of Ω, the B-conglomerable natural extension ofR, if it exists, is the smallest set F that containsR and satisfies D1–D5.
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Now we focus on a collection of conditional lower previsions P (·|B1), . . . , P (·|Bm), where B1, . . . ,Bm are
partitions of Ω. A set of desirable gamblesR induces a conditional lower prevision P (·|Bi) on L(Ω) by means of the
formula
P (f |Bi) := sup{µ : Bi(f − µ) ∈ R}, (B.1)
whenever f ∈ L(Ω) and Bi ∈ Bi.
Definition 14 (Conglomerable coherence for lower previsions). Let P (·|B1), . . . , P (·|Bm) be conditional lower
previsions. They are called conglomerably coherent if they can be induced through (B.1) from a coherent set of
desirable gambles that is conglomerable w.r.t. all the partitions B1, . . . ,Bm.
It is argued in [18] that the notion of conglomerable coherence, which is more restrictive than Walley’s notion of
coherence from Definition 3, is the one we should use when investigating the consistency of a number of conditional
lower previsions in case we accept Walley’s conglomerative principle. In this sense, we should talk of conglomerably
coherent independent products: these are the coherent lower previsions P on L(X1 ×X2) that satisfy conglomerable
coherence with the conditional lower previsions P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) that we can derive from the marginals of P using
the mutual irrelevance of X1 and X2.
The next result shows that, when one of the spaces is finite, conglomerable coherence reduces to coherence to the
extent of definining independent products: this is to say that restricting the attention to Walley’s coherence, as we have
done in the main body of this paper, is enough to cover also the extension to conglomerable coherence:
Theorem 18. Let P be a coherent lower prevision on L(X1 × X2) with marginals P 1, P 2. Assume that X1 is finite,
and define P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) by epistemic irrelevance. Then:
P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) conglomerably coherent⇔ P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) coherent.
Proof. The direct implication follows taking into account that conglomerable coherence is stronger than coherence, by
[18, Theorem 9]. Let us prove the converse. Let R,R1,R2 denote the sets of strictly desirable gambles associated
with P , P 1, P 2, respectively. Then it follows from the assumption of epistemic irrelevance that the conglomerable
natural extensions (with respect to X2 and X1, respectively) of the sets of strictly desirable gambles associated with
P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are given by
F1 : = {0 6= f ∈ L(X1 ×X2) : f(·, x2) ∈ R1 ∪ {0} ∀x2 ∈ X2}, (B.2)
F2 : = {0 6= f ∈ L(X1 ×X2) : f(x1, ·) ∈ R2 ∪ {0} ∀x1 ∈ X1}. (B.3)
It has been established in [18, Theorem 10] that the set of gamblesR⊕F1 ⊕F2 induces P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1), and
that it is a coherent set. Since X1 is finite, it only remains to prove that this set is X2-conglomerable to deduce that
P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are conglomerably coherent.
Let f 6= 0 be a gamble onX1×X2 such that Ix2f belongs toR⊕F1⊕F2∪{0} for every x2 ∈ X2. Consider x2 such
that Ix2f 6= 0. Then, there are gambles h ∈ R∪{0}, h1 ∈ F1∪{0}, h2 ∈ F2∪{0} such that Ix2f = h+h1 +h2. Note
that by construction h1 ≥ G1(h1|X2), h2 ≥ G2(h2|X1), and then the coherence of P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) implies that
P (h1) ≥ 0, P (h2) ≥ 0.
Let us consider a number of possibilities:
(a) If P (h) > 0, then P (Ix2f) ≥ P (h) + P (h1) + P (h2) > 0, whence Ix2f ∈ R.
(b) If (a) does not hold, then it must be h ≥ 0. In that case, we can redefine h1 := h1 + h ∈ F1 ∪ {0} and we obtain
that Ix2f = h1 + h2 ∈ F1 ⊕F2.
Let us define A1 := {x1 ∈ X1 : h2(x1, ·) ≥ 0}. We can assume without loss of generality that h2 = h2IAc1 ;
otherwise, we can redefine h1 := h1 + h2IA1 ≥ h1 ∈ F1 and h2 := h2IAc1 ∈ F2 ∪ {0}. To see the latter,
consider that h2(x1, ·) ∈ R2 ∪ {0} for all x1 ∈ X1; when we turn some of these h2(x1, ·)-gambles into zero,
they still belong toR2 ∪ {0}, so h2IAc1 is still in F2 unless it is identically equal to zero.
Now, if Ac1 = ∅, then we obtain with the transformation above that Ix2f = h1 ∈ F1. Assume next that Ac1 6= ∅
and therefore that h2 6= 0. Then it follows that for every x1 ∈ Ac1 we have that P 2(h2(x1, ·)) > 0.
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Ix1(h2(x1, ·)− (P 2(h2(x1, ·)− ε)) = G2(h2IAc1 |X1) + εIAc1 .
At this point, there are two possibilities:
(b1) If P (Ac1) > 0, then
P (h2) = P (h2IAc1) ≥ P (G2(h2IAc1 |X1)) + εP (Ac1) > 0,
taking into account that P (G2(h2IAc1 |X1)) ≥ 0 by the coherence of P , P 2(·|X1), and also that εP (Ac1) > 0.
Thus, in that case also P (Ix2f) ≥ P (h1) + P (h2) > 0, whence Ix2f ∈ R.
(b2) If on the other hand P (Ac1) = 0, we can also assume without loss of generality that h1 = h1Ix2 and
h2 = h2Ix2 .
∗ To prove this, assume that there is no x′2 6= x2 such that h1(·, x′2) 6= 0. Then it would already be the
case that h1 = h1Ix2 and as a consequence h2 = Ix2f −h1 = Ix2(f −h1), and therefore h2 = h2Ix2 .
∗ Assume now that there is x′2 6= x2 such that h1(·, x′2) 6= 0. Since
h1(x1, x
′
2) = (Ix2f − h2)(x1, x′2) = 0 ∀x1 ∈ A1,
we deduce that h1(·, x′2) = h1(·, x′2)IAc1 , whence P 1(h1(·, x′2)) = P 1(h1(·, x′2)IAc1) ≤ 0, using
that P 1(A
c
1) = P (A
c
1) = 0 together with [19, Lemma 1]. Since h1(·, x′2) ∈ R1 ∪ {0} and it is
non-zero by assumption, this can only be if h1(·, x′2) ≥ 0. Taking into account that h1(·, x′2) =
(Ix2f − h2)(·, x′2) = −h2(·, x′2), this means that h2(·, x′2) ≤ 0 for every x′2 6= x2.
Let A2 := {x′2 ∈ X2 : x′2 6= x2, h1(·, x′2) 6= 0}, and redefine h1 := h1 − h1IA2 ∈ F1 ∪ {0}, h2 :=
h2 + h1IA2 ≥ h2 ∈ F2 ∪ {0}. Then Ix2f = h1 + h2 and h1 = h1Ix2 by construction. Reasoning as
at the end of previous case we deduce that also h2 = h2Ix2 .
Now, if h2Ix2 ∈ F2 ∪ {0}, it means that for every x1 ∈ X1 the gamble h2(x1, ·) belongs to R2 ∪ {0}.
But this gamble can only be non-zero on x2, and as a consequence it must be h2(x1, x2) ≥ 0. From this
we deduce that h2 ≥ 0, and since we assumed before that h2 = h2IAc1 , we conclude that h2 = 0. Thus,
Ix2f = h1 ∈ F1 ∪ {0}, and since this gamble is different from zero we deduce that Ix2f ∈ F1.
We see then that whenever Ix2f is non-zero then it must belong to either R or F1. Both these sets are X2-
conglomerable; to see thatR is conglomerable, use that the coherence of P , P 1(·|X2) implies that they are conglomer-







Ix2f ∈ R⊕F1 ⊆ R⊕F1 ⊕F2.
This shows thatR⊕F1 ⊕F2 is X2-conglomerable and as a consequence P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are conglomerably
coherent.
It is instead an open problem whether coherence and conglomerable coherence are equivalent under independence
in general: we do not know yet if it is possible for two marginals P 1, P 2 to have an independent product P while
P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are not conglomerably coherent. Nevertheless, we have established a number of sufficient condi-
tions for this equivalence, which show that the two notions are very close also in this case. We must first establish the
following lemma:
Lemma 19. Let P be a coherent lower prevision on L(Ω) and consider A ⊆ Ω such that P (A) = 0. Given two
gambles f, g such that fIAc = gIAc , it holds that P (f) = P (g).
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Proof. We begin by showing that for any real number k it holds that P (f) = P (f + kIA). To see this, note that
P (kIA) =
{
kP (A) = 0 if k ≥ 0
−kP (A) = 0 if k < 0 and, similarly, P (kIA) =
{
kP (A) = 0 if k ≥ 0
−kP (A) = 0 if k < 0.
Since P (f) + P (kIA) ≤ P (f + kIA) ≤ P (f) + P (kIA), we deduce that P (f) = P (f + kIA). Now, if f = g on
Ac, by letting k := min{inf f, inf g}, k¯ := max{sup f, sup g}, we deduce that
fIAc + kIA ≤ f, g ≤ fIAc + k¯IA,
and as a consequence P (f) = P (g) = P (fIAc).
Theorem 20. Let P be a coherent lower prevision on L(X1 ×X2) with marginals P 1, P 2. Define P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1)
by epistemic irrelevance. Then P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are conglomerably coherent if and only if they are coherent
when any of the following conditions holds:
1. P 1(x1) > 0, P 2(x2) > 0 for every x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2.
2. P 1(x1) = 0 = P 2(x2) for every x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2.
3. Either P 1 or P 2 is vacuous.
Proof. Since conglomerable coherence is stronger than coherence by [18, Theorem 9], we only need to show that the
converse holds under any of the hypotheses of the theorem.
1. If P , P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are coherent, then they are in particular weakly coherent. Since P (x1) > 0, P (x2) > 0
for every x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2, we can apply [18, Theorem 13] to deduce that P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1) are also
conglomerably coherent.
2. Consider next the case where P 1(x1) = 0 = P 2(x2) for every x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2. Let F1,F2 be the sets of
gambles given by Eqs. (B.2) and (B.3). It has been showed in [18, Theorem 10] that F1⊕F2 is a coherent set that
induces P 1(·|X2), P 2(·|X1). Let us prove that this set is X2-conglomerable (the proof of X1-conglomerability is
analogous).
Consider a gamble f 6= 0 such that Ix2f ∈ F1⊕F2 ∪{0} for every x2 ∈ X2. Take x2 such that Ix2f 6= 0. Then
there are h1 ∈ F1 ∪ {0}, h2 ∈ F2 ∪ {0} such that Ix2f = h1 + h2. Let us prove that Ix2f belongs to F1.
There are a number of possibilities:
• If h1 ≥ 0, then Ix2f ≥ h2, and as a consequence it belongs to F2. This means that for every x1 ∈ X1 the
gamble Ix2f(x1, ·) belongs toR2 ∪ {0}. Since this gamble is only non-zero on (x1, x2), we deduce that
f(x1, x2) ≥ 0 for every x1 ∈ X1. Thus, Ix2f ≥ 0 and as a consequence it belongs to F1.
• If h2 ≥ 0 then Ix2f ≥ h1 and as a consequence it belongs to F1.
• Consider next the case where h1  0 and h2  0, and define
A1 := {x1 ∈ X1 : h2(x1, ·) ≥ 0}, A2 := {x′2 ∈ X2 : h1(·, x′2) ≥ 0}.
Let g1 := h1IAc2 , g2 := h2IAc1 . Since by construction g1, g2 6= 0, we deduce that g1 ∈ F1, g2 ∈ F2.
Moreover, g1 + g2 ≤ h1 + h2 = Ix2f , and P 2(g2|x1) = P 2(g2(x1, ·)) > 0 for every x1 ∈ S1(g2).
– Let us show that we can assume without loss of generality that S2(g2) ∩ {x2}c = S2(g1) ∩ {x2}c:
∗ If x′2 /∈ S2(g1), x′2 6= x2, then g1(·, x′2) = 0, whence g2(·, x′2) ≤ Ix2(x′2)f(·, x′2)−g1(·, x′2) = 0.
If we redefine then g2 by g2(x1, x′2) := 0 ∀x′2 /∈ S2(g1), x′2 6= x2, we still have that g2 ∈ F2
(because the new gamble dominates the one we had before) as well as that g1 + g2 ≤ Ix2f
(because (g1 + g2)(·, x′2) = 0 = Ix2(x′2)f(·, x′2)) , and also x′2 /∈ S2(g2).
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∗ On the other hand, given x′2 ∈ S2(g1) ∩ {x2}c, then P 1(g1(·, x′2)) > 0, and as a consequence,
P 1(g2(·, x′2)) ≤ P 1(−g1(·, x′2)) = −P 1(g1(·, x′2)) < 0, whence it must be g2(·, x′2) 6= 0, i.e.,
x′2 ∈ S2(g2).
Therefore, for every x′2 6= x2 such that x′2 ∈ S2(g2), we have that P 1(g2(·, x′2)) < 0. If x2 /∈ S2(g2),
then we would have that P 1(g2|x′2) < 0 for every x′2 ∈ S2(g2) and P 1(g2|x1) > 0 for every
x1 ∈ S1(g2). This is a contradiction with point (ii) of the characterisation of coherence established in
[24, Theorem 7.3.6]. We conclude from that theorem that
x2 ∈ S2(g2) and P 1(g2(·, x2)) ≥ 0. (B.4)
– Let us prove now that also x2 ∈ S2(g1). Assume ex-absurdo that g1(·, x2) = 0. Let us see that we can
modify the gamble g2 in order to contradict the coherence of the set of desirable gambles F1 ⊕ F2.
Define g′2 := Ixc2g2 on X1 ×X2. This gamble belongs to F2:
∗ Given x1 ∈ S1(g2), it holds that P 2(g′2(x1, ·)) = P 2(g2(x1, ·)) > 0, using Lemma 19. As a
consequence also x1 ∈ S1(g′2) and g′2(x1, ·) ∈ R2 ∪ {0}.
∗ If x1 /∈ S1(g2), then g2(x1, ·) = 0, whence also g′2(x1, ·) = 0 ∈ R2 ∪ {0}.
This means that g′2 ∈ F2 ∪ {0} and as a consequence g1 + g′2 ∈ F1 ⊕ F2. But g1 + g′2 ≤ 0: on the
one hand,
x2 /∈ S2(g1)⇒ g1(·, x2) = 0 and g′2(·, x2) = g2(·, x2)Ixc2(x2) = 0, so g1(·, x2) + g′2(·, x2) = 0,
and for every x′2 6= x2, it holds that
g1(·, x′2) + g′2(·, x′2) = g1(·, x′2) + g2(·, x′2) ≤ Ix2(x′2)f(·, x′2) = 0.
Since we are assuming that g1 6= 0, we obtain a contradiction with the coherence of F1 ⊕F2.
We conclude that
x2 ∈ S2(g1) and therefore P 1(g1(·, x2)) > 0. (B.5)
Thus,
P 1(f(·, x2)) ≥ P 1(g1(·, x2) + g2(·, x2)) ≥ P 1(g1(·, x2)) + P 1(g2(·, x2)) > 0,
where the last inequality is a consequence of Eqs. (B.4), (B.5). From this we conclude that Ix2f ∈ F1.
We see then that Ix2f belongs toF1 for every x2 ∈ X2 with Ix2f 6= 0. SinceF1 isX2-conglomerable, we deduce
that f also belongs to F1 ⊆ F1⊕F2. Thus, F1⊕F2 is X2-conglomerable. The proof of the X1-conglomerability
of F1 ⊕F2 is similar.
3. Finally, if P 1 is vacuous, then the set F1 it defines by means of Eq. (B.2) is given by L+, whence F1⊕F2 = F2
which is both X1- and X2-conglomerable. The proof if P 2 is vacuous is analogous.
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